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SARBANES-OXLEY AND REGULATION OF LAWYERS’ CONDUCT: 
PUSHING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE DUTY OF 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the 
world, and that person is his client.  To save that client by all means and 
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to 
himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing that duty he must not 
regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon 
others.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
While the words of Lord Brougham from Queen Caroline’s Case might 
sound unreasonable to most laymen, they reflect a central and longstanding 
canon of legal ethics.2  The attorney has a duty to act as a “zealous advocate” 
for the client.3  Corporate attorneys,4 however, operate in a slightly different 
context.  Whereas most attorneys’ loyalties lie solely with their clients, the 
corporate attorney must frequently balance the interests of the client against the 
interests of the investing public.5  These attorneys often find themselves in the 
troubling situation of having to decide what to do when they become aware 
that their corporate client has engaged or is engaging in wrongful or fraudulent 
conduct.6  Society places responsibilities on corporate and securities lawyers 
not faced by most attorneys: to play the role of corporate gatekeeper,7 a role 
 
 1. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 9 (1975) (citing 
2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (J. Nightingale ed., 1821)). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Throughout this comment, references to corporate attorneys, corporate clients, and 
corporate actors refer to parties who represent or work for corporations which are publicly traded 
and subject to federal securities laws. 
 5. Lisa H. Nicholson, A Hobson’s Choice for Securities Lawyers in the Post-Enron 
Environment: Striking a Balance Between the Obligation of Client Loyalty and Market 
Gatekeeper, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 91, 94-95 (2002). 
 6. Id. at 102-03. 
 7. “The term ‘gatekeeper’ suggests a guardian with independent professional 
responsibilities, including a responsibility for protecting the institution.”  SEC Commissioner 
Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Orison S. Marden Lecture Before the Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York (Nov. 17, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch111703hjg.htm 
[hereinafter Goldschmid Speech].  Corporate gatekeepers are responsible for vouching for the 
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traditionally associated with corporate accountants and auditors.8  However, 
exactly how these attorneys should behave in order to fulfill the dual roles of 
corporate gatekeeper and client advocate has frequently been a subject of 
debate.9 
Recently, this debate has been reignited.  Following the revelation of 
corporate fraud and misconduct at major corporations such as Enron, 
WorldCom, and Tyco,10 the federal government attempted to stabilize the 
securities markets and bolster investor confidence by passing the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (the “Act”).11  The Act includes civil and criminal 
provisions intended to affect the way in which corporate actors approach 
reporting financial information, conducting public audits, and compensating 
executives and officers.12  However, Congress did not intend to reach only 
corporate officers and accountants with this Act.  Section 307 of the Act 
includes a provision directing the Securities and Exchange Commission13 to 
promulgate “standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and 
practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of 
issuers.”14 
SEC Rule 20515 provides corporate and securities lawyers with greatly 
needed guidelines of behavior in the face of client fraud.  While some oppose 
any rules which would seemingly hamper the ideal of attorney-client 
confidentiality, section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley and corresponding SEC Rule 
205 serve an overriding purpose because they promote the public policy of 
 
transactions and statements of their clients.  Credibility, based on professional standards and 
reputation, is essential to their role because it enables the public to trust in their capability and 
integrity.  Typical categories of gatekeepers for public companies include independent auditors, 
debt rating agencies, securities analysts, investment bankers, and lawyers.  John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1404-05.  See 
also Nicholson, supra note 5, at 100-01. 
 8. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1417-18. 
 9. Nicholson, supra note 5, at 100-01.  “Securities lawyers must continually strike a 
balance between the competing considerations of protecting society’s interests in maintaining 
client confidentiality and ensuring the lawyers’ loyalty on the one hand, and that of protecting 
society’s interests in avoiding the substantial financial consequences of crimes or fraud on the 
other.” Id. at 94-95. 
 10. 148 CONG. REC. S6561-01 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Levin). 
 11. Peter Zalewski, Sarbanes’ First Year: Lawyers and Executives Have Spent Months and 
Money to Comply With Strict Corporate Governance Law, and More Limits Are Coming, MIAMI 
DAILY BUS. REV., July 21, 2003, at 11; Marc I. Steinberg, Lawyer Liability After Sarbanes Oxley 
– Has the Landscape Changed?, 3 WYO. L. REV. 371, 371 (2003). 
 12. Zalewski, supra note 11. 
 13. Hereinafter the “Commission” or the “SEC.” 
 14. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002). 
 15. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the 
Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2004). 
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investor protection.16  Furthermore, traditional arguments against allowing 
attorney disclosure of fraudulent conduct by the corporate client may be 
misguided and poorly reasoned. 
This comment will argue that federally mandated standards of attorney 
conduct for corporate and securities lawyers are necessary in light of the 
unique position these attorneys occupy.  The previous regime of imprecise 
federal standards, as well as conflicting and often inadequate state ethical 
standards, have proven ineffective in regulating the conduct of attorneys in the 
corporate arena.17  State ethics rules, which apply to attorneys generally, rarely 
adequately account for the particular role of corporate and securities lawyers.  
Because these attorneys are in the unique position of having to ensure their 
clients’ compliance with federal securities laws,18 they must balance 
competing interests: those of their clients and those of the investing public.  In 
order to successfully fulfill these dual roles, corporate and securities lawyers 
need a federal set of guidelines which proscribe standards of appropriate 
conduct when presented with client misconduct in order to successfully fulfill 
these dual roles. 
These standards should be imposed at the federal level because they serve 
the ultimate purpose of promoting compliance with federal securities laws.  
Furthermore, greater uniformity can be achieved by imposing these standards 
at the federal level as opposed to the state level.  Such uniformity is especially 
desirable due to the national and even international scale of many corporate 
clients and the law firms that represent them. 
Section II of this comment explores the background and history of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and section 307 by first examining regulation of attorneys 
by the SEC prior to the Act and then examining the social and economic 
background of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and section 307.  Section III will 
discuss and explain section 307 of the Act and corresponding Rule 205 as 
drafted by the SEC.  Section IV will discuss the actions taken by the American 
Bar Association in response to the corporate scandals which occurred at 
corporations such as Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco.  Section V of this comment 
will discuss the reactions of some state bar associations to Rule 205.  Section 
VI will present some of the major arguments both supporting and criticizing 
the adoption of a federal rule regulating the conduct of corporate attorneys and 
section VII will present a detailed analysis explaining why Rule 205 is 
ultimately a justified and necessary addition to federal securities laws. 
 
 16. See infra Part VII. 
 17. Nicholson, supra note 5, at 139. 
 18. Id. at 128. 
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II.  BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
A. Federal Regulation of Attorneys Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley 
Despite the traditional and well established role of the states and the 
organized bar in regulating attorney conduct,19 federal regulation of corporate 
attorneys is by no means a new concept.20  The SEC has traditionally used two 
primary avenues for sanctioning attorneys.21  One approach available to the 
SEC is to seek injunctions against attorneys in federal courts on the basis of 
violations or aiding and abetting violations of the anti-fraud provisions of 
federal securities laws.22 
A prominent example of this first type is Securities and Exchange 
Commission v. National Student Marketing Corp., in which the Commission 
sought injunctive relief against numerous defendants, including some of the 
lawyers representing their respective clients in a merger.23  The Commission 
attempted to impose sanctions against the lawyers of one of the parties to the 
merger, arguing that the lawyers had aided and abetted the client’s violations 
of securities laws because the lawyers did not attempt to dissuade their clients 
from going through with a planned merger upon discovery that some of the 
information disclosed in proxy statements for the merger was false.24  In this 
case, the SEC argued that because the attorneys did not withdraw their opinion 
letters regarding the merger and demand resolicitation of the shareholders of 
the company being acquired when they learned of certain misinformation, the 
lawyers aided and abetted the fraud.25  The SEC further argued that had the 
attorneys suggested an appropriate course of action and the directors refused, 
the “attorneys should have withdrawn from the representation and informed 
the shareholders or the Commission.”26  In this case, the court denied 
injunctive relief, finding that the SEC failed to demonstrate, as is required 
under section 21(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and section 20(b) 
of the Securities Act of 1933, that injunctive relief would be necessary to 
 
 19. JAMES E. MOLITERNO & JOHN M. LEVY, ETHICS OF THE LAWYER’S WORK 64 (1993). 
 20. Ann Maxey, SEC Enforcement Actions Against Securities Lawyers: New Remedies vs. 
Old Policies, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 537, 540-44 (1997). 
 21. Id. at 548.  Maxey identifies other forms of sanctions available to the SEC as well: “In 
appropriate cases, the SEC can also refer cases to the Justice Department for criminal 
prosecution.  In addition, the SEC can issue reports on investigations pursuant to § 21(a) of the 
Exchange Act.”  Id. at 548 n.46. 
 22. Id. at 550. 
 23. SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F.Supp. 682, 686-87 (D.D.C. 1978). 
 24. Id. at 699-701. 
 25. Id. at 700-01. 
 26. Id. at 701. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] SARBANES-OXLEY AND REGULATION OF LAWYERS’ CONDUCT 275 
 
prevent further violations of anti-fraud provisions.27  The court did hold, 
however, that the lawyers had aided and abetted the violations by not taking 
steps to persuade the client to comply with the law or ensure that shareholders 
were informed of the misstatements in the proxy solicitations.28  National 
Student Marketing sent an important message to attorneys about the 
Commission’s expectations regarding lawyers’ obligations when they become 
aware that their client is violating securities laws.  While the case did not 
suggest a clear course of action in such a situation, it did make clear that the 
Commission considered it unacceptable for attorneys to acquiesce to their 
clients’ fraudulent conduct.29 
A second regulatory tool available to the SEC is the use of Rule 102(e) of 
the Commission’s Rules of Practice, which has long been available to the SEC 
as a means of sanctioning securities lawyers.30  It allows the Commission to 
censure, suspend, or disbar professionals engaged in unethical or otherwise 
improper conduct;31 it does not, however, establish standards of behavior for 
such professionals.32  Three years after the conclusion of National Student 
Marketing, the Commission used its power to sanction professionals under 
Rule 102(e) in “its most prominent administrative proceeding against 
lawyers.”33  In In re Carter and Johnson (“Carter”), the Commission brought 
an action against two lawyers for concealing their knowledge of a client’s poor 
 
 27. Id. at 717. 
 28. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F.Supp. at 714. 
 29. Id. at 712. 
 30. Appearance and Practice Before the Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2004); 
Maxey, supra note 20, at 548-49.  Prior to 1995, Rule 102(e) was referred to as Rule 2(e), which 
was originally promulgated in 1935.  Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 71671 n.11 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).  Rule 102(e) does not apply strictly to lawyers, but rather any professionals 
who appear and practice before the Commission, including attorneys, accountants, and engineers.  
Id. at n.12. 
 31. Rule 102(e) provides: 
The Commission may censure a person or deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege 
of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the 
Commission after notice and opportunity for hearing in the matter: (i) [n]ot to possess the 
requisite qualifications to represent others; or (ii) [t]o be lacking in character or integrity 
or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct; or (iii) [t]o have 
willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any provision of the 
Federal securities laws or the rules and regulations thereunder. 
17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1)(i)-(iii). 
 32. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. at 
71670 & n.11. 
 33. Maxey, supra note 20, at 551. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
276 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:271 
 
financial position in order to ensure that a deal closed.34  The Commission 
decided that there were no clear and unambiguous standards of behavior to 
guide the attorneys in this case and therefore did not impose sanctions.35  The 
Commission did, however, interpret the meaning of “unethical or improper 
professional conduct”36 for purposes of Rule 102(e) proceedings against 
attorneys, to be applied in any future proceedings.37 
The standard laid down in Carter requires an attorney who becomes aware 
of a client’s violation of securities laws to “take[] prompt steps to end the 
client’s noncompliance.”38  Furthermore, the Commission indicated that as a 
preliminary matter, the attorney may simply “counsel[] accurate disclosure.”39  
Should the client fail to comply, however, the Commission stated that the 
attorney should take additional “affirmative steps,” which could include 
reporting the violation to higher officials within the organization in order to 
correct the problem.40  In this respect, the standard supplied by this case is 
simply a predecessor to the standards required by section 307 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.41 
The rule from Carter contributed to a mounting controversy between the 
Bar and the SEC regarding the SEC’s attempts to infringe upon the Bar’s 
traditional role in regulating attorney conduct.42  This controversy abated 
somewhat when then SEC General Counsel Edward Greene, in a 1982 speech, 
stated that the Commission would not initiate Rule 102(e) proceedings against 
a lawyer unless a federal court had determined that the lawyer had violated or 
aided and abetted a violation of securities laws.43  The SEC had abated its 
ability to enforce the standards promulgated only a year before in Carter.  
While still retaining the ability to discipline attorneys based on aiding or 
 
 34. In re Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,847, at 
84,158 (Feb. 28, 1981). 
 35. Id. at 84,172-73. 
 36. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(ii). 
 37. In re Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,847, at 
84,172.  Prior to Carter, the SEC had not previously defined this standard.  Theodore Sonde & F. 
Ryan Keith, “Up the Ladder and Over”: Regulating Securities Lawyers—Past, Present & Future, 
60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 331, 336 (2003). 
 38. In re Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,847, at 
84,172. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Like the standard first articulated in Carter, section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
required the SEC to promulgate a rule requiring an “up the ladder” reporting requirement for 
corporate attorneys.  See infra note 65 and accompanying text for further discussion of the 
requirements of section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
 42. Maxey, supra note 20, at 553. 
 43. Id. 
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abetting liability or through Rule 102(e) sanctions, the Commission rarely did 
so in the years following the Carter decision.44 
B. The Enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley and Section 307 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act came on the heels of various corporate and 
accounting scandals which had severely shaken investor confidence in the 
adequacy of corporate governance practices, independent accounting, and the 
trustworthiness of corporate attorneys.45  During the 1990s, American 
businesses and the stock market boomed.46  Companies, especially those in the 
high-tech sector, announced huge profit increases every year, which were often 
accompanied by huge increases in executive pay and compensation.47  
According to Senator Arthur Levin, chairman of the Senate’s Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, this corporate success was seen as “a 
justification for deregulating business, weakening regulators, and making it 
harder to seek corporate insiders and advisers.”48  Levin contends, however, 
that much of this loosening of corporate regulation shielded discovery of 
corporate misconduct which may have in large part contributed to the inflated 
profits of the 1990s.49 
The most highly publicized corporate scandal leading up to Sarbanes-
Oxley involved the collapse of Enron Corp.50  When the public became aware 
that Enron was creating outside partnerships as a means to remove debt from 
its balance sheets, Enron executives and auditors were not the only ones to face 
scrutiny and criticism.51  Enron’s outside attorneys, Vinson & Elkins, were 
also implicated in the scandal.52  When the firm was brought in to investigate 
suspicious activities at Enron, it issued opinion letters effectively authorizing 
fraudulent and illegal activities of the corporation.53  The firm’s role in either 
facilitating or at the very least overlooking the fraudulent activities of its client 
is by no means a unique situation.54  The potential ability of lawyers to play a 
more active role in promoting compliance with securities laws, and their 
disappointingly frequent failure to do so, prompted some members of Congress 
 
 44. Id. at 553-55. 
 45. 148 CONG. REC. S6561-01 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Levin). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at S6561-62. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See, e.g., One Big Client, One Big Hassle, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE (Jan. 28, 2002), at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_04/b3767706.htm. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. 148 CONG. REC. S6524, S6556 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Corzine). 
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to suggest an addition to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that would enhance lawyers’ 
obligation to act as corporate gatekeepers.55 
Section 307 was introduced based on the belief of its drafters that attorneys 
likely played major roles in many of the corporate scandals that had occurred 
in recent years.56  Senator Michael Enzi from Wyoming, one of the senators 
who introduced the bill, stated: “[O]ne of the thoughts that occurred to me was 
probably in almost every transaction there was a lawyer who drew up the 
documents involved in that procedure.”57  This was the rationale behind 
section 307.  The accounting industry has long been under the scrutiny of the 
federal government and the SEC due to the well established duty of corporate 
accountants and auditors to act as corporate gatekeepers.58  Furthermore, the 
SEC has had the power to regulate corporate attorneys for years under Rule 
102(e).59  Despite this, regulation of attorney conduct has traditionally been 
 
 55. Id. at S6551.  In introducing section 307 as a floor amendment, Senator Edwards stated: 
  The truth is that executives and accountants do not work alone . . . . If executives 
and/or accountants are breaking the law, you can be sure that part of the problem is that 
the lawyers who are there and involved are not doing their jobs.  For the sake of investors 
and regular employees, ordinary shareholders, we have to make sure that not only the 
executives and the accountants do what they are responsible for doing, but also that the 
lawyers do what they are responsible for doing as members of the bar and as citizens of 
the country. 
Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. 148 CONG. REC. S6524, S6554 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Enzi). 
 58. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995), 
(“PSLRA”) added section 10A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  This section mandated 
that outside auditors comply with standards issued by the SEC as well as Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principals.  The PSLRA also required accountants/auditors to report illegal acts to the 
issuer’s audit committee.  Finally, the PSLRA required that an accountant/auditor resign and 
notify the SEC of the resignation and the reason for it if the issuer continues in the illegal activity.  
Sonde & Keith, supra note 37, at 341-42.  See also Coffee, supra note 7, at 1405.  This final 
requirement is almost identical to “noisy withdrawal” provision of SEC Rule 205 for attorneys.  
See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text. 
 59. Speech to the New York County Lawyers’ Association by SEC General Counsel Edward 
F. Greene, Lawyer Disciplinary Proceedings Before the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,089, at 84,800 (Jan. 18, 1982) 
[hereinafter Greene].  See also Letter from Richard W. Painter, Professor of Law, University of 
Illinois (and 39 other law professors), to Harvey Pitt, SEC Chairman 2 (Mar. 7, 2002), at 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/responsibility_relatedmat.html) 
[hereinafter Letter from Richard W. Painter]; Stephanie R.E. Patterson, Professional 
Responsibility and Liability in a Post-Enron World: Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: 
Eroding the Legal Profession’s System of Self-Governance?, 7 N.C. BANKING INST. 155, 162 
(2003). 
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regarded as a job for state bar associations, and the federal government has 
only reluctantly challenged state authority on this matter in the past.60 
Following the revelation of multiple scandals in corporate America,61 the 
sponsors of section 307 felt that the corporate attorney’s time had come.  
Senator John Edwards, one of the sponsors of section 307, stated, “[w]ith 
Enron and WorldCom, and all the other corporate misconduct we have seen, it 
is again clear that corporate lawyers should not be left to regulate themselves 
no [sic] more than accountants should be left to regulate themselves.”62  The 
general belief was that state bar associations had failed to adequately safeguard 
against attorney misconduct and intervention by the federal government was 
needed.63 
III.  SARBANES-OXLEY AND S.E.C. RULE 205 
Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act directed the SEC to issue rules 
establishing “minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys 
appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the 
representation of issuers.”64  According to section 307, these standards should 
include a rule 
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities 
law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any 
agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the 
company (or the equivalent thereof); and 
 
 60. See Greene, supra note 59, at 84,802.  See also SEC Chairman Harvey L. Pitt, Remarks 
Before the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association’s Business Law Section (Aug. 12, 
2002), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch579.htm.  Twenty years ago Congress considered 
and rejected Senator Arlen Specter’s legislation entitled “Lawyer’s Duty to Disclose Act of 
1983.”  The legislation advocated imposing criminal sanctions against lawyers who failed to 
disclose to law enforcement prospective future crimes of their corporate clients, as well as past 
crimes where the client had misappropriated legal advice.  Abraham C. Reich & Michelle T. 
Wirtner, What Do You Do When Confronted With Client Fraud?, BUS. L. TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 
2002, at 39-40.  The SEC has also occasionally used its power to sanction attorneys under Rule 
102(e) or through aiding and abetting liability.  See supra notes 21-44 and accompanying text. 
 61. See 148 CONG. REC. S6561, S6562 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Levin) 
for a discussion of some of the corporate scandals which occurred at major corporations like 
WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, Global Crossing, etc. 
 62. 148 CONG. REC. S6524, S6552 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards). 
 63. Id.  Similarly, Senator Enzi remarked, “[I]n this case, the [s]tate bars as a whole have 
failed.  They have provided no specific ethical rule of conduct to remedy this kind of situation.  
Even if they do have a general rule that applies, it often goes unenforced.”  Id. at S6555.  See also 
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 67 Fed. 
Reg. at 71671 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205). 
 64. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
280 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:271 
 
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence 
(adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with 
respect to the violation), requiring the attorney to report the evidence to the 
audit committee of the board of directors of the issuer or to another committee 
of the board of directors comprised solely of directors not employed directly or 
indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.65 
On January 23, 2003 the Commission announced its adoption of Rule 
205.66  The basic provisions of Rule 205 provide for an “up the ladder” 
reporting regime.67  According to the rule, an attorney must report evidence of 
a material violation of securities laws, breach of fiduciary duty, or similar 
violations to appropriate parties within the client corporation.68  An objective 
standard should be applied in interpreting “evidence of a material violation” 
meaning that it would be “unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent 
and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a 
material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.”69  The 
attorney must first report such evidence to the chief legal counsel, chief 
executive officer, or both.70  The rule further outlines what actions must be 
taken by a chief legal counsel who receives such information.71  The next step 
an attorney may take if he or she does not reasonably believe the chief legal 
 
 65. Id.  The SEC was given 180 days from the day the Act was signed into law (July 30, 
2002), to adopt rules implementing section 307.  Implementation of Standards of Professional 
Conduct for Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 67 Fed. Reg. at 71670 n.4. 
 66. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Adopts Attorney Conduct 
Rule Under Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Jan. 23, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-13.htm. 
 67. Id.  See Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing 
Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1)-(4) (2004). 
 68. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1). 
 69. Id.  § 205.2(e). 
 70. Id.  § 205.3(b)(1). 
 71. Id.  § 205.3(b)(2). 
The chief legal officer (or the equivalent thereof) shall cause such inquiry into the 
evidence of a material violation as he or she reasonably believes is appropriate to 
determine whether the material violation described in the report has occurred, is ongoing, 
or is about to occur.  If the chief legal officer (or the equivalent thereof) determines no 
material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur, he or she shall notify the 
reporting attorney and advise the reporting attorney of the basis for such determination.  
Unless the chief legal officer (or the equivalent thereof) reasonably believes that no 
material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur, he or she shall take all 
reasonable steps to cause the issuer to adopt an appropriate response, and shall advise the 
reporting attorney thereof.  In lieu of causing an inquiry under this paragraph (b), a chief 
legal officer (or the equivalent thereof) may refer a report of evidence of a material 
violation to a qualified legal compliance committee under paragraph (c)(2) of this section 
if the issuer has duly established a qualified legal compliance committee prior to the 
report of evidence of a material violation. 
Id. 
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officer or chief executive officer has taken appropriate steps is to report to the 
audit committee of the board of directors; another committee consisting solely 
of directors not employed by the corporation and not “interested persons” in 
the case of an investment company; or the actual board of directors.72 
In the original proposed Rule 205, the SEC included a provision which 
would require an attorney to make a “noisy withdrawal” where an attorney had 
reported up the ladder and the board of directors had not provided an 
“appropriate response.”73  This portion of the rule required an attorney, in 
limited circumstances, to withdraw from representation and give the SEC 
written notification of the attorney’s withdrawal on the basis of “professional 
considerations” as well as disaffirm any documents or representations made to 
the SEC “that the attorney has prepared or assisted in preparing and that the 
 
 72. Id. § 205.3(b)(3).  Under 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c), the rule provides an alternative reporting 
method where the corporate client has established a qualified legal compliance committee 
(“QLCC”).  Where such a committee has been established the attorney may report directly to this 
committee as opposed to the “up the ladder” process outlined in section 205.3(b).  An attorney 
who reports to a QLCC has satisfied his or her legal obligations under Rule 205 and is not 
expected to assess the committee’s response to any reports of material violations.  17 C.F.R. § 
205.3(c)(1). 
 73. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324, 6326-27 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).  
Section 205.2(b) provides: 
(b) Appropriate response means a response to an attorney regarding reported evidence of 
a material violation as a result of which the attorney reasonably believes: 
(1) That no material violation . . . has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur; 
(2) That the issuer has, as necessary, adopted appropriate remedial measures, including 
appropriate steps or sanctions to stop any material violations that are ongoing, to prevent 
any material violation that has yet to occur, and to remedy or otherwise appropriately 
address any material violation that has already occurred and to minimize the likelihood of 
its recurrence; or 
(3) That the issuer, with the consent of the issuer’s board of directors, a committee thereof 
to whom a report could be made pursuant to § 205.3(b)(3), or a qualified legal compliance 
committee, has retained or directed an attorney to review the reported evidence of a 
material violation and either: (i) [h]as substantially implemented any remedial 
recommendations made by such attorney after a reasonable investigation and evaluation 
of the reported evidence; or (ii) [h]as been advised that such attorney may, consistent with 
his or her professional obligations, assert a colorable defense on behalf of the issuer (or 
the issuer’s officer, director, employee, or agent as the case may be) in any investigation 
or judicial or administrative proceeding relating to the reported evidence of a material 
violation. 
17 C.F.R. § 205.2(b).  This definition of what constitutes an “appropriate response” subjects the 
lawyer’s evaluation of the issuer’s response to a reasonableness standard.  An attorney may 
exercise his or her own judgment, so long as his or her determination is “reasonable.”  
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,  Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 68 
Fed. Reg. 6296, 6298-99 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205). 
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attorney reasonably believes is or may be materially false or misleading.”74  On 
November 21, 2002, the SEC released a proposed version of Rule 205 and 
invited interested parties to comment on the rule.75  The Commission’s release 
generated significant interest; 167 comment letters were received.76  The 
“noisy withdrawal” provision was one of the most controversial and highly 
criticized portions of the proposed rule.77  Due to the controversy generated by 
this provision of the rule, and the deadlines imposed by the Act, the 
Commission withdrew this portion in its final version of the rule, released on 
January 29, 2003.78  On that date the Commission also issued another release 
seeking further comment on the “noisy withdrawal” provision and an 
alternative version of this portion of the rule.79  Whereas the original version of 
the “noisy withdrawal” provision required the attorney to withdraw from 
representation and alert the Commission, the alternative suggested by the 
Commission in the January 29th proposed rule release required the issuer, as 
opposed to the attorney, to report the attorney’s withdrawal to the Commission, 
and additionally required the issuer to report such withdrawal to the public 
through 8-K, 20-F, or 40-F forms.80  While the Commission has received 
 
 74. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at 
6326-27. 
 75. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. at 
71670 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205). 
 76. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at 
6296. 
 77. See, e.g., Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President, American Bar Association, to 
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 18, 2002), at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/apcarlton1.htm [hereinafter Carlton Letter]; Letter 
from The Association of the Bar of the City of New York to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 7, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ 
s74502/abcny040703.htm. 
 78. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at 
6296.  The release accompanying the final rule stated: 
In light of the compressed time period resulting from the 180-day implementation 
deadline prescribed in the Act, a number of commenters requested that the Commission 
allow additional time for consideration of several aspects of the proposed rule, 
including . . . the impact of the “noisy withdrawal” and related provisions. 
Id. 
 79. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at 
6326. 
 80. Id.  The release states: 
  Section 205.3(e) of the alternative proposal requires an issuer (rather than its 
attorney) to report to the Commission an attorney’s written notice of withdrawal or failure 
to receive an appropriate response, as described in [section] 205.3(d) of the alternative 
proposal.  In connection with [section] 205.3(e) of the alternative proposal, the 
Commission also proposes to amend Forms 8-K, 20-F, and 40-F to require issuers to 
disclose publicly an attorney’s written notice of withdrawal within two business days of 
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numerous comments on both of these proposed alternatives, no decision has 
been made as to whether either one will eventually be included in the final 
rule.81 
To account for the situation where the attorney has reported “up the 
ladder” and does not believe appropriate remedial actions have been taken by 
the corporate client,82 the final rule as adopted also includes a provision 
allowing an attorney to reveal confidential information related to the 
representation of the client to the extent the he or she reasonably believes 
necessary 
(i) To prevent the issuer from committing a material violation that is likely to 
cause substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or 
investors; 
(ii) To prevent the issuer, in a Commission investigation or administrative 
proceeding from committing perjury . . . or committing any act . . . likely to 
perpetrate a fraud upon the Commission; or 
(iii) To rectify the consequences of a material violation by the issuer that 
caused, or may cause, substantial injury to the financial interest or property of 
the issuer or investors in the furtherance of which the attorney’s services were 
used.83 
This section of the rule is in line with Rule 1.6 of the ABA’s recent 
amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct84 and with the rules 
of a majority of state bar associations.85  Though not nearly as controversial as 
the “noisy withdrawal” provision, this section of the rule prompted some 
 
that notice.  Section 205.3(f) of the alternative proposal permits (but does not require) an 
attorney to inform the Commission of his or her withdrawal if the issuer does not comply 
with paragraph (e). 
Id. at 6328. 
 81. Sue Reisinger, Coping with Tighter Rules for Lawyers: Violations Must Go ‘Up the 
Ladder.’  Will ‘to the Government’ Be Next?, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 11, 2003, at 8. 
 82. See supra note 73 for the Commission’s definition of an “appropriate response” by an 
issuer. 
 83. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the 
Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2). 
 84. See infra notes 100-11 and accompanying text. 
 85. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at 
6310 n.92.  See also TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY 48-50 (2003), at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/ 
final_report.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2004) [hereinafter ABA CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 
REPORT]. 
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criticism,86 and while the SEC considered removing it from the final rule, it 
was ultimately included with only minor changes from the original proposal.87 
IV.  THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION RESPONSE 
In what may have been an attempt to avoid federal regulation of attorney 
conduct,88 the ABA, before the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, established the 
Corporate Responsibility Task Force (“Task Force”) to deal with the problem 
of attorney participation in and tolerance of corporate misconduct.89  The Task 
Force issued its final report on March 31, 2003,90 suggesting two major 
changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.91  One change was an 
amendment to Model Rule 1.13, which covers the organization as client.92  The 
amendments to Rule 1.13 include a mandatory “reporting up” requirement, 
requiring that an attorney representing an organization report crime or fraud to 
“higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the 
circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the 
organization.”93  Rule 1.13 was further amended to provide that, where an 
attorney has referred a violation of law to the highest authority in an 
organization and such authority fails to address the referral “in a timely and 
appropriate manner,” the attorney may “reveal information relating to the 
representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and 
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial 
injury to the organization.”94  The changes to Rule 1.13(b) impose a fairly 
 
 86. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at 
6310-11. 
 87. Id. at 6310. 
 88. Corporate Lawyers Smell a Rat, N.Y. LAW. (Sept. 26, 2002), at 
http://www.nylawyer.com/news/02/09/092602d.html.  Bruce A. Green, an ethics professor at 
Fordham University School of Law, was quoted as saying: “If for no other reason, the 
recommendations were an attempt to head Congress off at the pass.”  Id.  Despite the ABA’s 
hopes to self-regulate before Congress could take action, Sarbanes-Oxley, which included section 
307 that mandated Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, was signed into law on July 30, 
2002, two weeks after the Task Force issued its preliminary report.  Id. 
 89. Linnea B. McCord & Gia H. Weisdorn, Blowing the Whistle: Will Your Corporate 
Attorney Be the New Whistleblower?, 6 GRAZIADIO BUS. REP. 6, ¶ 9 (2003), at 
http://gbr.pepperdine.edu/033/lawyers.html. 
 90. ABA CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 85. 
 91. Id. at 77-89. 
 92. Id. at 82-89; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003). 
 93. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003).  The Task Force recommended this 
change to Rule 1.13(b) because, by suggesting some general potential courses of action, the 
former rule could “confuse rather than clarify the mandatory nature of the lawyer’s obligations 
under the rule.”  ABA CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 85, at 41-44. 
 94. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (2003).  Under pre-amended Rule 
1.13(c), the attorney had the option to resign in accordance with Rule 1.16.  The pre-amended 
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similar duty to that required by the “up the ladder” requirements of section 307 
of Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC Rule 205.95 
The Task Force also recommended changes to Model Rule 1.6.96  Prior to 
the 2003 amendments, Rule 1.6 permitted an attorney to disclose client 
confidences in limited circumstances: “to prevent reasonably certain death or 
substantial bodily harm; to secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance 
with these Rules; to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer . . . or 
to comply with other law or court order.”97  While the ABA’s Model Rules are 
typically consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct in most states,98 the 
majority of states had gone beyond the limits of Model Rule 1.6 and provided 
further exceptions to the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality in their rules of 
professional conduct.99  It was in recognition of this fact that the ABA 
Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (“Ethics 2000 
Commission”) suggested updating Model Rule 1.6 to better reflect the law in 
most states in its August 2001 report.100  Ultimately, the ABA House of 
Delegates rejected the recommended changes in its 2001 amendments.101  
However, in light of increasing scrutiny of the failure of gatekeepers following 
 
rule did not permit the attorney to “reveal information relating to the representation.”  The 
amended comments to Rule 1.13 state: 
Paragraph (c) of this Rule supplements Rule 1.6(b) by providing an additional basis upon 
which the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation, but does not 
modify, restrict, or limit the provisions of Rule 1.6(b)(1)-(6).  Under Paragraph (c) the 
lawyer may reveal such information only when the organization’s highest authority insists 
upon or fails to address threatened or ongoing action that is clearly a violation of law, and 
then only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably 
certain substantial injury to the organization.  It is not necessary that the lawyer’s services 
be used in furtherance of the violation, but it is required that the matter be related to the 
lawyer’s representation of the organization. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 6 (2003). 
 95. Judith Burns, Attorneys Face a Paradox in the SEC’s Conduct Rules, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
19, 2003, at C1. 
 96. ABA CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 85, at 77-81. 
 97. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983). 
 98. Nicholson, supra note 5, at 136. 
 99. ABA CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 85, at 51.  According to the final 
report of the Task Force, “forty-one states permit a lawyer to disclose client information in order 
to prevent a client from perpetrating a fraud that constitutes a crime, and eighteen states permit 
such disclosure to rectify substantial loss resulting from client crime or fraud in which the client 
used the lawyer’s services.”  Id. at 49.  The report provides a state by state break down of which 
states allow disclosure and under what circumstances.  Id. at 49 n.89. 
 100. Id. at 52.  See ETHICS 2000 COMMISSION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ETHICS 2000 
REPORT 20-26 (2001), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-report_home.html (last visited Oct. 29, 
2004). 
 101. Nicholson, supra note 5, at 143-44. 
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the corporate scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and others,102 as well as 
a desire to “keep Congress from intruding on its turf,”103 the ABA established 
the Task Force in 2002, and was once again offered the suggestion of updating 
Model Rule 1.6.104  This time, the House of Delegates listened.  At its August 
2003 Annual Meeting, the ABA House of Delegates added two further 
exceptions to the general mandate of Rule 1.6 prohibiting disclosure of client 
confidences.105  According to the amended rule, a lawyer is permitted to 
disclose client confidences 
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably 
certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of 
another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s 
services; 
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or 
property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the 
client’s commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has 
used the lawyer’s services.106 
The amendments to Model Rule 1.6 permit attorneys to breach client 
confidentiality and report the misconduct of corporate clients if necessary to 
prevent or rectify criminal or fraudulent acts of such clients that could cause 
financial harm to others.107  This change to the Model Rules is important 
because it is a more accurate reflection of the existing law in the majority of 
states.108  However, the changes and additions may have little practical effect.  
The final version of Rule 205 was published in the Federal Register on 
February 6, 2003,109 months before the ABA House of Delegates met to amend 
their Model Rules.110  Furthermore, because the changes to Rule 1.6 merely 
bridge the gap between the ABA’s former position and the approach already 
 
 102. 148 CONG. REC. S6561, S6561-63 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Levin). 
 103. Corporate Lawyers Smell a Rat, supra note 88. 
 104. ABA CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 85, at 77-81. 
 105. Myron Levin, ABA Code Targets Corporate Crimes, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2003, at C1.  
The general rule regarding client confidences provides: “A lawyer shall not reveal information 
relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is 
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by 
paragraph (b).”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2003). 
 106. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)-(3) (2003). 
 107. Id. 
 108. ABA CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 85, at 51. 
 109. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at 
6296 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205). 
 110. Nat Slavin, ABA Sends General Counsel on a Rough Ride, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 
2003, at 4. 
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taken by most states in their rules of professional conduct,111 these changes 
should only have a minor impact upon the rules of individual states. 
V.  STATE BAR REACTIONS AND THE PREEMPTION DEBATE 
When the SEC released the final version of Rule 205, it noted in the 
accompanying release that some commentators on Rule 205 questioned 
whether the Commission’s rule could preempt state ethics codes.112  The 
Commission responded to these concerns, stating: 
  The language which we adopt today clarifies that this part does not 
preempt ethical rules in United States jurisdictions that establish more rigorous 
obligations than imposed by this part.  At the same time, the Commission 
reaffirms that its rules shall prevail over any conflicting or inconsistent laws of 
a state or other United States jurisdiction in which an attorney is admitted or 
practices.113 
Despite the SEC’s assertions, the Washington State Bar Association’s Board of 
Governors took issue with the rule, and released an Interim Formal Ethics 
Opinion on July 26, 2003,114 ten days before Rule 205 was to take effect, 
warning Washington attorneys not to reveal any client confidences outside of 
the corporate organization.115  The opinion clearly states: “To the extent that 
the SEC regulations authorize but do not require revelation of client 
confidences and secrets under certain circumstances, a Washington lawyer 
should not reveal such confidences and secrets unless authorized to do so 
under the RPCs [Rules of Professional Conduct].”116 
 
 111. Carlton Letter, supra note 77. 
 112. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at 
6297.  In the release accompanying Final Rule 205 the Commission stated: 
  A number of commenters questioned the Commission’s authority to preempt state 
ethics rules, at least without being explicitly authorized and directed to do so by Congress.  
Another comment letter noted that the Constitution’s Commerce Clause grants the federal 
government the power to regulate the securities industry, that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
requires the Commission to establish rules setting forth minimum standards of conduct for 
attorneys appearing and practicing before it, and that, under the Supremacy Clause, duly 
adopted Commission rules will preempt conflicting state rules. 
Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Washington State Bar Association Board of Governors, Interim Formal Ethics Opinion 
Re: The Effect of the SEC’s Sarbanes-Oxley Regulations on Washington Attorneys’ Obligations 
Under the RPCs (2003), at http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/ethics/default1.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 
2004) [hereinafter Washington Ethics Opinion]; Sue Reisinger, Two State Bar Groups Protest 
SEC Rule on Disclosing Civil Violations, PALM BEACH DAILY BUS. REV., Sept. 29, 2003, at 18. 
 115. Washington Ethics Opinion, supra note 114, at 1. 
 116. Id. 
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Under Rule 1.6 of the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct, an 
attorney may only reveal client confidences in very limited circumstances.117  
Like the SEC rule, this is a permissive rule; the lawyer is not required to report 
anything.  The important distinction between the Washington ethics rule and 
SEC Rule 205 is the circumstances under which a lawyer may make such 
disclosures.  Under the Washington rule, such disclosure is limited to the 
extent necessary to prevent the client from committing a crime, to establish a 
claim or defense on the lawyer’s behalf, to respond to allegations in any 
proceeding concerning the representation, or pursuant to a court order.118  
Under Rule 205, however, an attorney is authorized to reveal client 
confidences to the SEC to the extent that he or she reasonably believes 
necessary to prevent the client from committing a material violation likely to 
cause “injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or investors.”119  
Furthermore, a “material violation” is defined in the rule to mean “a material 
violation of an applicable United States federal or state securities law, a 
material breach of fiduciary duty . . . , or a similar material violation of any 
United States federal or state law.”120  Therefore, the SEC’s rule allows for 
disclosure under a much broader set of circumstances than Washington’s rule 
permits. 
In order to prevent Washington state attorneys from relying on an 
argument of good faith compliance with the SEC Rule,121 the Washington 
opinion clearly states “an attorney who takes action contrary to this Formal 
Opinion cannot . . . fairly claim to be complying in good faith with the SEC 
 
 117. WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1990).  The Washington rule prohibits a 
lawyer from revealing client confidences or secrets relating to the representation except “to the 
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (1) [t]o prevent the client from committing a 
crime; or (2) [t]o establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer . . . .”  Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the 
Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(i).  An attorney may also reveal client confidences to the 
Commission in two other situations under Rule 205: 
(ii) To prevent the issuer, in a Commission investigation or administrative proceeding 
from committing perjury . . . or committing any act . . . likely to perpetrate a fraud upon 
the Commission; or 
(iii) To rectify the consequences of a material violation by the issuer that caused, or may 
cause, substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or investors in 
the furtherance of which the attorney’s services were used. 
17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c)(2). 
 120. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(i). 
 121. Subsection (c) of Rule 205.6 states: “An attorney who complies in good faith with the 
provisions of this part shall not be subject to discipline or otherwise liable under inconsistent 
standards imposed by any state or other United States jurisdiction where the attorney is admitted 
or practices.”  17 C.F.R. § 205.6(c). 
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Regulations.”122  The Board justifies this assertion by arguing that there would 
be no conflict between Rule 205 and the Washington Rules of Professional 
Conduct.123  Furthermore, because Rule 205 is permissive,124 an attorney may 
comply with the stricter Washington RPCs limiting disclosure and still 
technically be “in compliance” with the SEC Regulations.125  The Board 
argues that because Rule 205.6(c) uses the term “complies”126 a lawyer can use 
this good faith defense against state disciplinary actions only in relation to 
mandatory, not permissive, provisions of the SEC Regulations.127 
In an attempt to dissuade the Washington Bar from issuing its opinion, 
SEC General Counsel Giovanni Prezioso wrote a letter to the President and 
President-Elect of the Washington Bar Board of Governors on July 23, 
2003.128  He began by noting that because Rule 205 applies only in limited 
circumstances, conflicts between the state and federal laws would be 
uncommon.129  Prezioso then discounted the Washington Bar’s argument that 
such conflicts would not occur.130  Furthermore, he argued that Supreme Court 
precedent clearly validates the Commission’s ability to preempt conflicting 
state law.131  Prezioso referred to Sperry v. State of Florida132 to establish “the 
authority of federal agencies to implement rules of conduct that diverge from 
and supersede state laws that address the same conduct.”133  Prezioso also 
 
 122. Washington Ethics Opinion, supra note 114, at 7. 
 123. Id. 
 124. “[T]he fact that Section 205(d)(2) states that a lawyer ‘may reveal’ confidential 
information but does not mandate a revelation gives the lawyer discretion to determine whether to 
make such a disclosure.”  Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Washington Ethics Opinion, supra note 144, at 7. 
 128. Letter from Giovanni P. Prezioso, SEC General Counsel, to J. Richard Manning, 
President, and David W. Savage, President-Elect, Washington State Bar Association (July 23, 
2003), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch072303gpp.htm [hereinafter Letter from Giovanni 
P. Prezioso].  Prezioso’s intent was clearly to convince the Washington State Bar Board of 
Governors to back down from the position taken in the Washington Ethics Opinion.  He stated: 
“As the Board of Governors considers the Proposed Interim Formal Opinion, and as the WSBA 
RPC Committee contemplates revisions to Washington RPC 1.6, perhaps these comments will aid 
your deliberations by providing the Commission’s perspective on the relevant sections of its new 
attorney-conduct rules.”  Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  Prezioso’s letter states: “Despite the narrow scope of the Commission’s rules, the 
Proposed Interim Formal Opinion does identify potential areas of conflict.”  Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Sperry v. State of Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963). 
 133. Letter from Giovanni P. Prezioso, supra note 128.  In Sperry, the Supreme Court held 
that, where Federal Patent Office regulations authorized practice before the Patent Office by non-
lawyers, Florida could not enjoin a non-lawyer from preparing and prosecuting patent 
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asserted that Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta134 establishes 
that where a state law prohibits an attorney from pursuing a course of action 
which the attorney has discretion to pursue based on a federal regulation, the 
federal regulation takes priority.135  Finally, Prezioso disputed the Washington 
Bar’s assertions regarding the ability of an attorney to establish a defense of 
good faith compliance with federal regulations in a state disciplinary 
proceeding.136  Prezioso cited several Supreme Court cases in asserting that, 
when interpreting a federal regulation, states must defer to the federal agency’s 
interpretation.137  Therefore, it would be improper for Washington’s State Bar 
to determine whether an attorney could establish a “good faith” defense in a 
state disciplinary proceeding; as such, a determination of what constitutes 
“good faith” compliance should be made by the SEC.138 
While Washington attempted to make the argument that there was not 
necessarily a conflict between the SEC Rule and the Washington Rules of 
Professional Conduct,139 some members of the California Bar took an even 
stronger stance in opposition to the SEC’s Rule 205.140  In an August 13, 2003 
letter to Prezioso,141 the Corporations Committee of the Business Law Section 
of the California State Bar (the “Committee”) questioned the SEC’s authority 
 
applications in Florida, even though such practice was unauthorized under Florida’s State Bar 
rules.  Sperry, 373 U.S. at 400-03. 
 134. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982). 
 135. Letter from Giovanni P. Prezioso, supra note 128 (quoting de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 
155). 
 136. Id.  See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text for an explanation of the Washington 
ethics opinion’s position regarding the unavailability a “good faith” compliance defense. 
 137. Letter from Giovanni P. Prezioso, supra note 128.  Prezioso’s letter cites three Supreme 
Court cases for this assertion: Barnard v. Walton, 535 U.S 212 (2002), United States v. Locke, 
529 U.S. 108 (2000), and City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57 (1989). 
 138. Letter from Giovanni P. Prezioso, supra note 128. 
 139. Peter Erlichman, a spokesman for the Washington Bar, stated that because Rule 205 is 
permissive, not mandatory, the Washington Bar had found no conflict between the SEC rule and 
Washington law.  Sue Reisinger, States’ Rights All Over Again, CORP. COUNS., Nov. 2003, at 24. 
 140. George A. Riemer, SEC v. State Bars?  Preemption Showdowns Could Be on the 
Horizon, OR. ST. BAR BULL., Dec. 2003, at 22. 
 141. This letter was written in response to SEC General Counsel Giovanni P. Prezioso’s July 
23, 2003 public statement/letter to the Washington State Bar Association.  The position set forth 
in this letter is that of the twenty-five member Corporations Committee of the Business Law 
Section of the State Bar of California; it has not been adopted by the California State Bar as a 
whole or by the Business Law Section.  Letter from the Corporations Committee of the Business 
Law Section, State Bar of California, to Giovanni P. Prezioso, General Counsel of the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 13, 2003), at http://www.ethicsandlawyering.com/ 
Issues/0903.htm [hereinafter Corporations Committee Letter]. 
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to preempt state ethics rules.142  Like Washington, California imposes a stricter 
duty upon its attorneys with regard to maintaining client confidences.143  The 
permissive disclosure allowed by Rule 205 is contrary to this standard.144  In 
its letter to the SEC, the Committee made a strong argument questioning the 
authority of the Commission to adopt Rule 205 in its current form.145  
According to the Committee, “the preemptive effect of these rules will be 
challenged on the basis that there is no evidence of Congressional intent to 
preempt state ethics rules.”146  The Committee went on to point out that “in 
other instances, courts have struck down SEC rulemaking for lack of 
authority,”147 and argued that none of the statutory provisions which the SEC 
relied on as authority in adopting the final version of Rule 205 demonstrate 
 
 142. Id.  “The Committee believes that the authority of the SEC to adopt either Rule 205.3(d) 
or Rule 205.6(c) could be challenged and that it is realistic to believe that the SEC’s authority will 
be challenged.”  Id. 
 143. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e)(1) (West 2004).  Section 6068(e)(1) requires an 
attorney to “maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve 
the secrets, of his or her client.”  Effective July 1, 2004, section 6068 was amended to allow 
permissive disclosure where necessary to prevent a criminal act likely to result in death or 
substantial bodily harm.  This is the still, however, the only exception to the California lawyer’s 
duty of confidentiality.  Id.  See also CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-600 (2003) 
(describing an attorney’s duty of confidentiality in the representation of an organization).  This 
duty has also been adopted by federal district courts in California: 
Thus, attorneys appearing and practicing before these federal courts are obligated to 
comply with California’s rules regarding the protection of client confidences.  For 
example, Local Rule No. 83-3.1.2 of the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California Provides: 
In order to maintain the effective administration of justice and the integrity of the 
Court, each attorney shall be familiar with and comply with the standards of 
professional conduct required of members of the State Bar of California and contained 
in the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California, 
and the decisions of any court applicable thereto.  These statutes, rules and decisions 
are hereby adopted as the standards of professional conduct, and any breach or 
violation thereof may be the basis for the imposition of discipline. 
Corporations Committee Letter, supra note 141. 
 144. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. 
 145. Corporations Committee Letter, supra note 141. 
 146. Id.  The committee has not been alone in advancing this argument based on legislative 
intent.  Michael O’Sullivan, a corporate partner at Los Angeles law firm Munger Tolles & Olson, 
argued that the cases cited by Prezioso (in his letter to the Washington State Bar Association 
Board of Governors) as the basis for federal preemption were based on congressional intent, 
whereas the legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley does not indicate an intent to change lawyers’ 
reporting requirements to the SEC.  Sue Reisinger, Two State Bar Groups Protest SEC Rule on 
Disclosing Civil Violations, PALM BEACH DAILY BUS. REV., Sept. 29, 2003, at 18.  According to 
O’Sullivan, on a number of occasions members of Congress were told that the bill would not 
require corporate lawyers to report to the SEC.  Id. 
 147. Corporations Committee Letter, supra note 141. 
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congressional intent to allow the SEC to grant corporate lawyers the right to 
disclose client confidences.148  Furthermore, the Committee’s letter discounted 
Prezioso’s reliance on Sperry v. State of Florida as authority for the SEC’s 
ability to preempt state law.149  In Sperry, the Committee argued, there was 
clear Congressional intent to grant a federal agency the authority to formulate 
regulations,150 whereas here, there was no evidence that Congress intended the 
SEC to have the authority to preempt state ethical rules and grant attorneys a 
right of permissive disclosure to the SEC.151  Furthermore, the Committee 
noted that the United States Supreme Court has previously made a point of 
avoiding the federalization of corporate laws, an area typically governed by 
state law, “absent a clear indication of congressional intent” to do so.152  The 
Committee cited the language of federal case law to reiterate this point.153  The 
court in Pennsylvania Medical Soc’y v. Marconis stated “[w]hen Congress 
remains silent regarding the preemptive effect of its legislation on state laws it 
knows to be in existence at the time of such legislation’s passing, Congress has 
failed to evince the requisite clear and manifest purpose to supersede those 
state laws.”154 
After questioning the authority of the SEC to pass Rule 205 in its current 
form, the Committee’s letter to the SEC raises another important objection.  
 
 148. Id.  The Committee’s letter states: 
In the adopting [sic] the final rules, the SEC cites as authority the following statutory 
provisions: Sections 3, 307, and 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; Section 19 of the 
Securities Act of 1933; Sections 3(b), 4(C), 13 and 23 of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, Sections 38 and 39 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, and Section 211 of the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.  Not one of these statutes even hints that Congress 
intended to invest the SEC with broad authority to permit lawyers disclose [sic] client 
secrets much less require that they do so and then immunize or otherwise protect those 
lawyers who do. 
Id.  Furthermore, in evaluating the SEC’s reliance on section 307 as granting authority to adopt a 
rule making disclosure of client confidences to the SEC permissive in certain circumstances, the 
Committee states that “references in Section 307 to ‘public interest’ and ‘protection of investors’ 
are simply too general to evidence any actual intent by Congress to empower the SEC to adopt 
rules allowing attorneys to divulge client confidences and establish immunity for those who do.”  
Id. at n.9. 
 149. Corporations Committee Letter, supra note 141.  See supra notes 132-33 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of Prezioso’s reliance on Sperry v. State of Florida. 
 150. Corporations Committee Letter, supra note 141.  The letter also argues that Sperry can 
be distinguished from the present situation because, in that case, the regulations of the Patent 
Office allowed non-lawyers to practice before it, which was a commonplace occurrence before 
Congress passed the statute.  Id.  However, in this situation, “the SEC’s rules represent a radical 
change from historical patters of state regulation of attorneys.”  Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. (quoting Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977)). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. (citing Pa. Med. Soc’y v. Marconis, 942 F.2d 842, 844 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
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According to the Committee, Article III, section 3.5 of the California 
Constitution prevents the State Bar from failing to enforce section 6068(e) of 
the California Business and Professions Code.155  Section 3.5 states: 
An administrative agency, including an administrative agency created by the 
Constitution or an initiative statute, has no power . . . (c) To declare a statute 
unenforceable, or to refuse to enforce a statute on the basis that federal law or 
federal regulations prohibit the enforcement of such statute unless an appellate 
court has made a determination that the enforcement of such statute is 
prohibited by federal law or federal regulations.156 
Based on this section, the Committee argued that the State Bar is required to 
enforce section 6068(e), despite the claims of the SEC that Rule 205 
preempts.157  Furthermore, a final order or judgment of an appellate court158 
upholding the preemptive effect of the federal law would be necessary in order 
for the State Bar to fail to enforce section 6068(e) in favor of Rule 205.159 
In a speech before the New York City Bar Association160 SEC 
Commissioner Harvey J. Goldschmid161 commented upon some of the 
preemption issues raised by the Washington opinion and the letter from the 
Committee of the California Bar.162  Goldschmid pointed out that section 307 
of the Act states that the “Commission shall issue rules, in the public interest 
and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of 
professional conduct for attorneys . . . including a rule . . . [requiring ‘reporting 
up’].”163  Goldschmid argued that this language clearly indicates that Congress 
intended the SEC to have fairly broad discretion in drafting these standards.164  
Furthermore, while not commenting upon the letter from the Corporations 
Committee of the Business Law Section of the California State Bar, 
 
 155. Corporations Committee Letter, supra note 141.  See supra note 143 for a discussion of 
section 6068(e). 
 156. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5. 
 157. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at 
6297 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt 205); Letter from Giovanni P. 
Prezioso, supra note 128. 
 158. The Committee’s letter states that a judgment from a trial court would not be sufficient.  
In order for the State Bar to refuse to enforce section 6068(e), an affirmation by an appellate court 
would be needed.  Corporations Committee Letter, supra note 141. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Goldschmid Speech, supra note 7. 
 161. Harvey Goldschmid has been a Commissioner of the SEC since July of 2002.  Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. (quoting Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002)). 
 164. Id.  Goldschmid stated: “Obviously, the words ‘minimum standards’ and ‘including’ are 
critical to any serious consideration of the various ‘reporting out’ issues that I am about to 
discuss.”  Id. 
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Goldschmid said the following with regard to the Washington Interim Formal 
Ethics Opinion: 
I believe that the position of the Washington State Bar Association is legally 
untenable, and its ethical opinion constitutes an essentially lawless act.  In 
policy terms, the Washington State Bar Association is acting contrary to the 
positions of the SEC, at least 40 states, and, since August, the American Bar 
Association.  It will be a tragedy, for which the Washington State Bar 
Association will have to accept substantial responsibility, if a Washington 
State lawyer – who would have “reported out” ongoing, serious financial fraud 
– fails to do so on the basis of the Bar Association’s deeply flawed ethical 
opinion.165 
While thus far, the conflict between the states and the SEC has yet to come to a 
head, the fact that such a conflict will eventually occur appears to be 
inevitable.166  Both the Washington Bar and the Committee of the California 
Bar have posed serious challenges to Rule 205, setting the stage for future 
questions and confusion. 
VI.  ARGUMENTS FAVORING AND OPPOSING RULE 205 
A. Arguments Favoring Federal Standards for Attorney Conduct 
While the SEC gave corporate attorneys some indication of what standards 
of behavior the Commission expected them to adhere to in cases such as In re 
Carter and SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.,167 the task of regulating 
and disciplining attorneys was still seen primarily as the role of state bar 
 
 165. Goldschmid Speech, supra note 7. 
 166. While such a conflict is likely to occur at some point, the question of when is much less 
clear.  Goldschmid makes an important point in his speech to the New York City Bar Association.  
He argues that issues related to reporting outside a corporate client when such client has failed to 
stop or rectify fraud or other serious violations, “while of large emotional concern to many in the 
bar, are of considerably less practical importance than the ‘reporting up’ approach . . . it will be a 
most unusual circumstance . . . where reporting up to senior executives and independent directors 
will not stop wrongdoing or reckless behavior.”  Id.  Goldschmid’s statement seems especially 
valid in light of the “zero tolerance” regulatory environment post Sarbanes-Oxley.  John J. 
Falvey, Jr. & Matthew A. Wolfman, The Criminal Provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley: A Tale of 
Sound and Fury?, 12 ANDREWS DEL. CORP. LITIG. REP. 23 (2003).  If an attorney could 
potentially report violations outside the corporate entity, it seems likely that corporate actors 
would do everything in their power to avoid such an outcome. 
 167. See supra notes 23-44 and accompanying text.  In Carter, the SEC warned that lawyers 
must “take prompt steps to end the client’s noncompliance,” yet failed to explain what course of 
action an attorney in that position should pursue.  Nicholson, supra note 5, at 120 (quoting In re 
Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,847, at 84,172 (Feb. 28, 
1981)). 
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associations.168  While these cases gave some indication of appropriate 
behavior, the standards are merely suggestive,  and the infrequent use of 
sanctions under Rule 102(e) and aiding and abetting liability pursuant to Rule 
10b-5 have provided only limited guidance to corporate attorneys.169  Prior to 
Rule 205, there was no consistent set of guidelines for corporate lawyers to 
follow when they became aware of fraudulent conduct by their clients.170  
While some have criticized the rule because it requires an attorney to make 
difficult determinations as to the legality of the client’s conduct,171 it serves an 
important purpose by providing attorneys with a framework of actions not 
available under the myriad of current federal securities laws or state ethical 
rules.172 
Not only does Rule 205 provide lawyers with a workable framework of 
potential behavior, it also remedies the problem of inconsistency in the current 
scheme of state ethics rules governing attorney conduct in this area.173  
Professor of legal ethics Richard W. Painter, commenting on the SEC’s 
proposed Rule 205, stated that “[w]hen the client is an issuer of securities 
subject to federal securities laws, there should be a nationwide standard 
allowing the lawyer to disclose.”174  Current state ethics rules on client 
confidentiality impose inconsistent standards regarding disclosure of 
confidential information.175  Such inconsistency is especially troubling for law 
firms with offices in different jurisdictions, or any attorney or firm 
 
 168. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
 169. Nicholson, supra note 5, at 107.  See supra Part II.A. for a discussion of lawyer liability 
under SEC Rules 102(e) and 10b-5. 
 170. Nicholson, supra note 5, at 107. 
 171. See infra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 172. Nicholson, supra note 5, at 120-22, 136. 
 173. Letter from Richard W. Painter, supra note 59 (commenting on proposed Rule 205). 
 174. Id.  See also Nicholson, supra note 5, at 139.  In arguing for the need for the American 
Bar Association to update its current Model Rules to allow permissive disclosure by attorneys 
faced with client fraud, Nicholson states: 
[A]n amended Model Rule 1.6 will promote uniformity among the states.  The ABA’s 
goal of uniformity by establishing clear-cut rules is lost with respect to Model Rule 1.6.  
However, as in the case of the professional responsibility rules in other substantive areas, 
an amended Model Rule 1.6 could persuade all states to review their existing rules and 
sign on to a new, clear-cut ABA disclosure standard. 
Id.  Since publication of Nicholson’s article, the ABA has made changes to Model Rule 1.6.  See 
supra Part IV. 
 175. Nicholson, supra note 5, at 136-37.  “An overwhelming majority of these states have 
adopted, whole cloth, the standards articulated by the ABA in most of the significant areas of 
professional responsibility, with one glaring exception: client confidentiality.  States have 
adopted varying versions of Model Rule 1.6.  Consequently, Model Rule 1.6 is anything but the 
‘model.’”  Id. at 136. 
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representing a national or multi-national corporation.176  For example, a large 
firm with offices in both Hawaii and California faces a special dilemma.  
Under the laws of one state, disclosure in certain circumstances is mandatory, 
but in another it may not be permitted at all.177 
Furthermore, Rule 205’s permissive disclosure standard does not 
necessarily pose a threat to the lawyer’s ethical duty of confidentiality owed to 
the client.  According to legal scholar Paul G. Haskell, while the duty of 
confidentiality is unquestionably an important one, it should not necessarily be 
applied in all situations.178  In his book Why Lawyers Behave as They Do, 
Haskell states that “[t]he purpose of confidentiality is to facilitate the lawyer’s 
efforts to obtain what the client is entitled to under the law.”179  By this 
reasoning, the purpose of confidentiality is not served when the client has 
committed a fraud, because the client is not entitled to do so under the law.  
Similarly, in discussing pre-amended Rule 1.6 of the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, professor of law Lisa Nicholson points out that the right 
to confidentiality should effectively be waived by a client who wrongfully uses 
the attorney’s legal services.180  Where a client puts the attorney in such a 
situation, the attorney is exposed to potential liability.181  As Nicholson states, 
“[W]here clients abuse the lawyer-client relationship, they should be deemed 
to have waived any claim to client confidentiality that is a by-product of such 
relationship.”182 
B. Arguments Opposing Federal Standards of Attorney Conduct 
Many legal scholars and practitioners have long been opposed to any 
change in federal securities laws or the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct that may hamper the lawyer’s ability to fulfill his duty of 
confidentiality and zealous advocacy.  Following the passage of the Sarbanes-
 
 176. Letter from Richard W. Painter, supra note 59 (commenting on Proposed Rule 205). 
 177. See HAW. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 
6068(e) (West 2004). 
 178. PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE AS THEY DO 59 (1998). 
 179. Id. at 57.  Haskell specifically discusses the non-applicability of confidentiality when a 
client seeks a lawyer’s assistance in connection with the commission of a crime.  However, 
Haskell’s argument for why the duty of confidentiality should not apply in such circumstances is 
equally applicable to a situation where the client has or is going to commit fraud or a violation of 
securities laws. 
 180. Nicholson, supra note 5, at 147.  While Nicholson’s argument relates to a client actually 
using the attorney’s services in committing fraud, the same argument can be applied where the 
client has asked the attorney to keep confidential information relating to a past or ongoing fraud 
or crime. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
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Oxley Act, the President of the State Bar of Texas criticized section 307 of the 
Act:183 
  Historically, and in the best interest of our clients as well as the general 
public, lawyers have not been perceived as ‘certified public attorneys.’  Our 
responsibility has been to our clients, with specific rules that apply if our 
opinions and/or advice are known by us as being intended to be relied upon by 
third parties or the public in general.  Our responsibility is and should continue 
to be to zealously represent our clients.  We are not and should not be expected 
to be whistleblowers, corporate policeman, [sic] or graders of the accountant’s 
school papers.184 
The most frequently cited argument against permissive disclosure is that it 
would harm the attorney’s ability to zealously represent the client.185  The 
traditional reasoning for the rule regarding client confidentiality is that if the 
client cannot trust that all communications with the attorney will be kept 
confidential, the client will not feel comfortable communicating with the 
attorney in order to seek legal advice.186  Many attorneys do not feel that they 
should be held responsible for protecting the public-at-large in addition to 
protecting the interests of their individual clients.187 
Lawrence J. Fox, an attorney at Drinker, Biddle & Reath in Philadelphia, 
has consistently been a vigilant and vocal supporter of the importance of 
protecting client confidentiality.188  Fox has stated, “Academics have this lofty 
notion that lawyers should do good for society.  But I’m not buying it.  I don’t 
think we should put the lawyers in a position where they have duties to the 
 
 183. Guy Harrison, Protecting Our Profession, 65 TEX. BAR J. 678 (2002). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Mitchell Pacelle & Michael Schroeder, Proposed SEC Rules Could Turn Lawyers Into 
Whistle-Blowers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2003, at A1.  See also Corporations Committee Letter, 
supra note 141.  The letter of the Corporations Committee of the California Bar states: 
The Committee recognizes that lawyers in private practice can play a unique and often 
pivotal role under the federal securities laws.  Nonetheless, that role does not make private 
attorneys an adjunct to the SEC in enforcing those laws.  Indeed, the Committee believes 
that our adversarial system of justice will not work unless attorneys can act as 
independent advocates and advisers to their clients. 
Id. 
 186. James P. Schaller, The Wrong Tack: Upending Client Confidentiality Would Destroy 
Client Confidence, CAL. LAW (Aug. 15, 2001), at www.law.com/regionals/ca/opinions/stories/ 
edt0815_com_schaller.shtml (last visited Oct. 29, 2004); Steven Andersen, Plaintiffs Chip Away 
at Attorney-Client Privilege, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 2003, at 22. 
 187. Sarah Boxer, Lawyers Are Asking, How Secret Is a Secret?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2001, 
at B7. 
 188. Id.  See also LAWRENCE J. FOX, ETHICS 2000 COMMISSION, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, ETHICS 2000 MINORITY REPORT (2001), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-
dissent.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2004). 
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public, except in cases of death or bodily harm.”189  When the ABA Ethics 
2000 Commission proposed changes to the Model Rule 1.6, which would 
allow disclosure to “prevent, mitigate or rectify a client fraud in which the 
lawyer’s services have been employed,” Fox disagreed with the Commission’s 
recommendations in his dissenting opinion.190  Fox cited a number of reasons 
why attorneys should not be allowed to disclose clients’ confidences.191  One 
major problem cited by Fox is that asking an attorney to be responsible for 
catching client fraud may be asking too much.192  Fox argues: “The false 
premise is that when a lawyer is dealing with client fraud, it will be apparent 
on its face.  It is so easy to say the words ‘when a lawyer uncovers fraud, she 
should be able to disclose it.’  But fraud does not appear that way save in the 
rarest of cases.”193 
VII.  ANALYSIS 
An evaluation of the need for a federal rule regulating attorney conduct 
implicates a balancing test of competing and often conflicting interests. Those 
two interests are the lawyer’s duty to the client and the need to protect the 
investing public from unscrupulous corporate behavior.  Resolution of this 
conflict requires two basic considerations.  The first issue requires 
consideration of what the proper role of the corporate attorney is.  Should 
attorneys, representing a corporate client, be subject to the same standards and 
duties regarding client confidentiality as lawyers acting in more of an 
adversary role?194  The second issue requires a determination of who should be 
responsible for regulating attorney conduct.  Should the bar associations of the 
individual states be responsible for regulating members’ conduct and 
disciplining them if they fail to act appropriately, or should the SEC, the 
federal agency charged with protecting the investing public, have a say in the 
regulation of attorney conduct when those attorneys are appearing and 
practicing before the Commission?  Legal scholars, law practitioners, and 
regulators have heatedly debated these questions and have presented powerful 
arguments for both sides.195 
 
 189. Boxer, supra note 187 (quoting Lawrence J. Fox). 
 190. FOX, supra note 188. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Some legal scholars have argued that securities lawyers are in “professional jeopardy” 
because of attempts by the SEC to alter their duties to their clients, thereby hampering their 
ability to “zealously represent” the client.  FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 21. 
 195. See supra Part VI for some of the central arguments in favor of and in opposition to a 
federal rule regulating attorney conduct. 
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The classic role of the attorney as an advocate of the client is a 
longstanding canon of legal ethics.  This role has traditionally embraced two 
important duties of an attorney: the duty of loyalty to the client, and the duty to 
protect and preserve client confidences.196  Without these basic elements of the 
attorney-client relationship, clients would not be able to put full trust in their 
attorneys, and the attorneys’ ability to best protect the interests of their clients 
could be damaged.197  The corporate attorney, however, operates in a 
somewhat different role than a criminal attorney or civil litigator. When a 
corporate entity acts in a way contrary to the interests of the investing public, 
the corporate attorney who knows of such malfeasance and fails to take steps 
to prevent or rectify these acts may be taking his or her duties to the client too 
far.  In these circumstances, the lawyer is not protecting the client’s best 
interests in the face of an opposing party in the courtroom.  Rather, the 
opposition in such cases is the investing public, who, despite the best efforts of 
the SEC,198 has no advocate acting on its behalf when dealing with the 
corporation.  In these circumstances, the role of the attorney is different than it 
would be in a litigation or negotiation setting.  The corporate attorney must be 
aware of an obligation to the public at large, as well as to his or her client. 
Recently, it has become increasingly clear that the existing system of 
checks on corporate America has failed to provide adequate safeguards to 
investors.199  Lawyers can no longer be viewed merely as tools of their 
corporate clients.  Instead, they must also be aware of a duty to protect 
investors from their clients’ wrongful acts.  Clearly, such conflicting roles of 
advocate and gatekeeper may often be difficult to reconcile.  Because these 
lawyers are in the unique position of having to ensure their clients’ compliance 
with federal securities laws, they must continually balance the competing 
interests of their clients and the investing public, who the federal securities 
laws are meant to protect.  It is for this reason that a clear set of standards of 
behavior are needed to guide corporate attorneys in striking a balance between 
their conflicting duties.  Furthermore, federal, as opposed to state, regulation is 
desirable for two reasons.  First, it allows for uniformity in an area of law 
where state ethical standards have varied significantly.200  This is especially 
desirable in light of the national and sometimes international operations of so 
 
 196. John W. Amberg & Jon L. Rewinski, Issues of Loyalty and Confidentiality Continue to 
Dominate Developments in Legal Ethics, 26 L.A. LAW. 31, 32 (2003). 
 197. Id. at 34. 
 198. Despite the important task faced by the Commission, the agency has only limited 
resources and a “meager” staff with which to achieve these lofty objectives.  FREEDMAN, supra 
note 1, at 21. 
 199. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text. 
 200. Letter from Richard W. Painter, supra note 59.  This letter was written in response to the 
SEC release seeking comments on proposed Rule 205. 
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many public companies, as well as the large scale of many of the law firms 
which represent these corporate clients.201  Second, because such standards 
would ultimately serve the purpose of promoting greater compliance with 
federal securities laws, it seems logical that a set of federal standards would be 
most appropriate. 
Rule 205 provides corporate attorneys with much needed guidance 
regarding how to behave when faced with evidence of fraudulent behavior by 
the corporate client.  As discussed above, under the current scheme of state 
ethical rules and corporate securities laws, attorneys may have had little 
helpful guidance as to appropriate conduct when dealing with client fraud prior 
to SEC Rule 205.202  Furthermore, Rule 205 will not only benefit corporate 
attorneys, it should also impact positively upon capital markets because it 
allows investors to have greater confidence that corporate fraud will be less 
likely to be overlooked by corporate attorneys.203  The rule will provide much 
needed uniformity among jurisdictions regarding ethical rules for corporate 
attorneys.204  Moreover, because Rule 205 introduces the threat of disclosure, 
corporate attorneys may be able to more successfully dissuade clients from 
continuing or failing to rectify the results of fraudulent conduct.205 
While many authorities, especially many practicing attorneys, argue that 
allowing disclosure of client confidences in the face of fraudulent conduct will 
have a “chilling effect” on clients’ willingness to communicate with attorneys 
and seek legal counsel,206 this argument may be more theoretical than 
practical.207  Corporate actors still have incentives to seek the advice of 
attorneys.208  Furthermore, despite the above discussed policy rationales for 
 
 201. Id. 
 202. Nicholson, supra note 5, at 107. 
 203. Id. at 139.  Nicholson argued for the need for the ABA to amend Model Rule 1.6, 
however, the same rationale lends support to the argument favoring federal standards of behavior 
for attorneys, as provided by SEC Rule 205. 
 204. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text. 
 205. Nicholson, supra note 5, at 139; William H. Simon, Perspective: Managerial 
Confidentiality Is Overrated, N.Y. LAW J., Oct. 2, 2003, at 2. 
 206. Schaller, supra note 186; Andersen, supra note 186, at 22. 
 207. Simon, supra note 205. 
 208. Letter from Susan P. Koniak, Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, et al., 
to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 7, 2003), at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/lawprofs040703.htm.  This letter was sent in response 
to the January 29, 2003 SEC release seeking commentary on final and proposed Rule 205.  The 
letter states: 
Corporate clients (through their agents) confide in corporate lawyers (to the extent they 
do, which is now imperfect and always will be) because corporations need legal advice.  
Period.  There is no evidence whatsoever that corporate clients have avoided lawyers in 
those few states that now require disclosure of client illegality or those states that permit 
such disclosure. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] SARBANES-OXLEY AND REGULATION OF LAWYERS’ CONDUCT 301 
 
confidentiality,209 the policy supporting disclosure by corporate attorneys 
where their corporate client is engaging in violations of securities laws should 
ultimately be deemed to outweigh any conflicting considerations.  When 
corporate attorneys are forced to balance the interests of their clients against 
the interests of the investing public, the need to protect the public from fraud 
and misinformation must outweigh the duty to protect the clients’ confidences. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Corporate attorneys occupy a unique role in the legal system.  Unlike most 
lawyers, who must concern themselves only with the interests of their clients, 
corporate attorneys must recognize and take responsibility for their duty to the 
investing public to act as a corporate gatekeeper.  Recent scandals in corporate 
America have prompted many to ask what went wrong.210  While corporate 
officers, boards of directors, and auditors are often looked to as the source of 
corporate malfeasance, the role of lawyers in these debacles has not escaped 
scrutiny.211  Therefore, when Congress decided to take action by passing the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, a provision directed toward regulating the 
conduct of corporate attorneys was included.212  Corresponding SEC Rule 205 
has prompted substantial debate and controversy in the legal community.  
Many have opposed the rule as an improper infringement upon the territory of 
the state bar associations in regulating attorney conduct.  Others have claimed 
 
Id.  See also Simon, supra note 205.  Simon states: 
[A]gents continue to seek legal advice, in part because there are compensating 
inducements to do so, and risks of not doing so.  Failing to seek legal advice can forfeit 
the protections of the “business judgment” rule for civil liability, and the benefits of the 
“advice of counsel” defense for criminal liability.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, by increasing 
the threat of both kinds of liability, will probably have a far greater effect in encouraging 
legal consultation than any attorney-disclosure duty could have in reducing it. 
Id.  In his article, Simon was specifically addressing the potential effects of the “noisy 
withdrawal” provision still under consideration by the SEC, as opposed to the “permissive 
disclosure” standard which the current version of Rule 205 imposes. 
 209. See supra Part VI.B. 
 210. See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text. 
 211. 148 CONG. REC. S6524, S6551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards).  In 
introducing section 307 as a floor amendment, Senator Edwards stated: 
  The truth is that executives and accountants do not work alone . . . . If executives 
and/or accountants are breaking the law, you can be sure that part of the problem is that 
the lawyers who are there and involved are not doing their jobs.  For the sake of investors 
and regular employees, ordinary shareholders, we have to make sure that not only the 
executives and the accountants do what they are responsible for doing, but also that the 
lawyers do what they are responsible for doing as members of the bar and as citizens of 
the country. 
Id. 
 212. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002). 
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that the rule violates the ethical duty of confidentiality by allowing for 
permissive disclosure of client confidences in certain circumstances.  Some 
legal professionals, such as those in Washington and California, have expressly 
challenged the Rule. 
Despite whatever validity these arguments may or may not have, Rule 205 
serves important policy rationales that are too often ignored or overlooked by 
the legal community.  Corporate attorneys must take responsibility for their 
duty to the public.  When the corporate client misbehaves, attorneys must not 
look the other way and hope for the best.  Rule 205 will help to ensure that 
these lawyers start taking responsibility and thereby promote full disclosure 
and protect the greater public interest against corporate wrongdoings. 
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